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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the asymmetric market valuation of both negative and positive
special items as explained by accounting conservatism. I argue that special items, also
known as nonrecurring operating gains and losses, have asymmetric market valuations, as
tested using earning response coefficients (ERC).

I

believe that this difference in ERC

between positive and negative special items can be explained by accounting
conservatism.

This thesis has two main findings: (1) an asymmetry exists in the

valuation of positive and negative special items; and (2) the asymmetry can be explained
by the idea of accounting conservatism, which is the tendency that firms report economic
losses on a timelier basis than economic gains. The above two findings are supported by
my empirical tests, which show that negative special items are more value relevant (i.e.
have a higher ERC) than positive ones due to the fact that nonrecurring losses are
impounded in earnings much quicker than nonrecurring gains. Thus, negative and
positive special items are not valued equally by investors - an asymmetry exists.
Furthermore, as the level of conservatism increases within a firm, this asymmetry of
market valuation becomes larger, signifying that the value relevance of negative special
items increases at a rate greater than that of positive special items.

Any questions or suggestions regarding the research can be forwarded to the author at
mktrimble@eiu.edu.
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1. Introduction

The issue of the value relevance of special items to investors has been an area of much
debate over the last few decades (Black et al., 2000; Cready et al., 2010; Elliott and
Hanna, 1996; Francis et al., 1996). However, there has been no existing literature that
connects the value relevance of special items and accounting conservatism. This research
attempts to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on the market valuation of special
items on the income statement and its relation with accounting conservatism.

More

specifically, I provide empirical evidence that the market valuation multiples of positive
and negative special items are asymmetric and offer an explanation of this phenomenon
based on accounting conservatism. As a result of my study, I find that positive special
items, which are special accounting gains, have a valuation coefficient not significantly
different from zero, as measured by the earnings response coefficient (ERC), while
negative special items, which are special accounting charges, have a significantly higher
valuation coefficient, as measured by ERC. This empirical finding led me to consider
accounting conservatism as a potential explanation for the asymmetric valuation
coefficients on positive and negative special items, as accounting conservatism has the
tendency to delay the recognition of good economic news but accelerate the recognition of
bad economic news.
Special items have been investigated in the accounting literature from a variety of
perspectives. The research paper by Elliott and Hanna (1996) investigates the nature and
the impact of special items on stock prices. According to Elliott and Hanna (1996, 135)
special items are defined as large nonrecurring or unusual charges, both positive and
negative, arising from the firm' s earnings from continuing operations.

This definition,

which excludes income from discontinued operations and extraordinary items, has been
adopted by the subsequent literature. After Elliott and Hanna (1996), additional research
has shown significant interest in researching special items, partly driven by the fact that
the frequency of special items reported in financial statements has increased dramatically
in the last fifty years (Black et al., 2000; Cready et al., 201O; Elliott and Hanna, 1996;
Francis et al., 1996).
Much of the literature on special items has been trying to understand the nature of
special items and how different types of special items are valued differently by investors.
-4-

For example, Elliott and Hanna (1996), one of the first studies on special items,
investigates the earnings response coefficient of special items in relation to the reporting
frequency. They find that special items have a lower valuation coefficient when the firm
frequently reports special items. This result is independently confirmed by Black et al.
(2000) in their study which uses stock price level as the main dependent variable as
opposed to the abnormal stock returns used by Elliot and Hanna (1996).

In contrast,

Cready et al. (2010), addressing almost the same research topic using a different kind of
empirical design, find the opposite result to that reported by Elliott and Hanna (1996) and
Black et al (2000). In particular, Cready et al. show that the firm has a higher valuation
coefficient on special items when its frequency of reporting special items increases. Thus,
this matter is not fully settled and conflicting results still exist in the accounting literature.
Another study by Francis et al. (1996) separates special items into different categories,
such as restructuring charges, gains/losses on sale of assets, impairment charges, etc., and
they discover that investors value different categories of special items differently.
However, little research to date has linked the value relevance of special items with
accounting conservatism, which, according to Basu (1997), Penman and Zhang (2002) and
Watts (2003a), is one of the longest and most prevailing principles in accounting. In the
accounting literature, accounting conservatism is commonly interpreted as the timely
reporting of economic losses and the delayed recognition of economic gains (Basu, 1997;
Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Khan and Watts, 2009; Penman and
Zhang, 2002; Watts, 2003a; Watts, 2003b). This concept of accounting conservatism is
also known as "conditional" conservatism according to Beaver and Ryan (2000) 1• This
concept indicates that firms require a lower verification threshold on reporting losses than
gains, thus increasing the timeliness of the reported losses and decreasing the timeliness of
reported gains.

Additionally, Basu (1997) reports that the persistence of gains is

significantly greater than the persistence of losses due to the fact that losses are generally

1 Conditional conservatism is defined at news-dependent conservatism which means that whether the
news is considered "good" or "bad" is the cause of the asymmetrical valuation of different accounting items
(Wang et al., 2009). However, unconditional conservatism is considered news-independent conservatism
It was Beaver and Ryan's (2000) theory that unconditional conservatism should be measured using
Basu's ( 1 997) asymmetrical timel iness model and conditional conservatism should be measured using
market-to-book.
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transitory and have little to no effect on future cash flows whereas gains have been shown
to have a much more persistent effect on future earnings (Watts, 2003b ).
Despite the importance of accounting conservatism, the value relevance literature has
rarely incorporated accounting conservatism into its research agenda. For example,
Holthausen and Watts (2001) criticizes value relevance literature, partially on the ground
that the value relevance research ignores accounting conservatism. However, because
there is nothing in the value relevance literature that is fundamentally and conceptually
inconsistent with accounting conservatism, researchers should theoretically be able to
accommodate accounting conservatism in value relevance studies. As Barth et al. (2001)
note,

"Value relevance studies can accommodate conservatism, and can be used to study
the implications of conservatism for the relation between accounting amounts and
equity values. In fact, value relevance research is a basis for establishing that some
financial accounting practices are perceived by equity investors as conservative. "
(Barth et al.,

2000,

p. 78)

I agree with Barth et al. (2001) in that the conservatism and value relevance literature
are not irreconcilable, and that the value relevance literature is able to accommodate
conservatism. In particular, I attempt to incorporate accounting conservatism in the
particular research area of the value relevance of special items. The next two paragraphs
outline the key argument of this paper.
The central tenet of this paper is that accounting conservatism causes an asymmetry
between the market valuation of positive and negative special items. In particular, positive
special items have a lower market valuation (as estimated by ERC), while negative special
items have a higher market valuation (as estimated by ERC). The reason is the following:
due to accounting conservatism, good economic news is impounded in stock prices much
quicker than can be reflected in earnings. Therefore, when a firm reports certain good
news as a positive special item in the income statement, the stock price of the firm has
already incorporated that good news in previous periods. In other words, positive special
items are much delayed recognitions of some past good news. Hence, positive special
- 6 -

items should theoretically have very little relevance to stockholders in the current period
as the same news has already been absorbed by stock prices an earlier period. Conversely,
certain bad economic news is likely reflected in both stock prices and earnings as a
negative special item in the same period because accounting conservatism means bad
news is recognized much faster than good news. This implies that the earnings response
coefficient for the negative special item is positive and more significant than positive
special items.
In addition, positive special items have little information content to investors, and thus
little value relevance, because substantial time have elapsed between the original event
and its reporting in earnings, which gives investors ample opportunities to obtain the same
information regarding that event from other non-earnings sources, such as management
voluntary disclosures, analyst reports and sometimes, insiders. In contrast, for bad news,
the time interval between the original event and its inclusion in earnings are relatively
short, which means that investors would have fewer opportunities of obtaining sufficient
information regarding the even from other sources. In this situation, the earnings release
would provide investors a lot of useful information about the economic event and
investors will adjust the stock price accordingly. Hence, it is contended from an
information content perspective that positive special items have lower value relevance
than negative special items.
To date, few empirical studies in the value relevance literature have incorporated
accounting conservatism. An exception is the forthcoming study by Balachandran and
Mohanram (2011 ), who argue that increased level of conservatism does not yield any
change in the value relevance of earnings. Because Balachandran and Mohanram (2011)
do not find any empirical evidence to support their argument that increased level of
conservatism within a firm leads to any change in the value relevance of the firm's
accounting information, the authors conclude that accounting conservatism and value
relevance appears to be unrelated.
This study, however, finds the opposite empirical evidence to that of Balachandran
and Mohanram (2011) by investigating specifically special items in the income statement.
The finding shows that when accounting conservatism increases, the value relevance of
positive special items decreases to a point of irrelevance, but the value relevance of
-7 -

negative special items increases, as predicted. In my opinion, the difference between my
empirical result and that of Balachandran and Mohanran (2011) is likely cause by two
factors: First, Balachandran and Mohanran' s study examines the value relevance of total
earnings, which include many income and expense items. Some earnings items are more
sensitive to accounting conservatism while some others are not. Therefore, Balachandran
and Mohanram's general earnings test may not have sufficient statistical power to detect
the subtle relationship between conservatism and value relevance. My research, instead,
focuses on one particular type of earnings alone - special items - which as I argue later is
quite sensitive to accounting conservatism. By focusing on special items, this study is able
to detect a significant association between accounting conservatism and value relevance of
special items. Second, the proxies for value relevance are different between these two
papers. Balachandran and Mohanran (2011) utilize mainly R squared as a proxy for value
relevance, while my paper applies earnings response coefficient (ERC) as a proxy for
value relevance. This difference is, of course, a matter of the researcher's subjective
choice, as both the R squared and the ERC are extensively used in the value relevance
literature.
The remainder of this thesis is organized into seven sections. Section 2 offers a quick
review of the literature on the value relevance of special items and the literature on
accounting conservatism.

Section 3 develops my hypotheses. Section 4 describes my

sample data and specific calculations of data items. The empirical tests and results are
discussed in section 5. In section 6, I discuss the merits and drawbacks of an alternative
explanation for my empirical finding and avenues for future research. And finally, section
7 contains the conclusion and limitations of this thesis.

2. Literature Review
2.1 Literature on the value relevance of special items

Starting from Elliott and Hanna (1996), a number of empirical studies have explored
the effect of nonrecurring gains and losses on firm returns. In particular, researchers have
examined the value relevance of seemingly transitory, special items on the income
statement to investors.

It is theoretically hypothesized that special items should have

limited value relevance to investor due to their largely transitory nature. But the empirical
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findings are not as clear-cut and there has been some controversy as to the direction and
magnitude of the value relevance of different types of special items.
Elliott and Hanna (1996) suggest that special items in general have lower value
relevance than ordinary operating items because of their transitory nature.

This is

supported by their empirical finding that the earnings response coefficient (ERC) for
special items is lower than that of earnings from normal operations. Their second
argument states that as the frequency of special items increases, the value relevance of a
firm' s special items further decrease.

Their second argument can be interpreted as

investors expect certain firms to report special items in consecutive quarters, such as the
result of implementing a restructuring strategy over a period of time. Hence, investors
would have anticipated further special items in future quarters and priced the entire
restructuring strategy in the first quarter. As a result, subsequent quarters' special items
would generate lower price reactions than the initial quarters that reported special items.
However, Cready et al. (2010) find that the value relevance of special items increases
as the frequency of special items increases, which directly contradicts Elliott and Hanna's
findings. Using a different research design, Cready et al. (2010) suggest that investors
value special items more as ordinary business operations when special items have a higher
frequency of occurrence. Cready et al. (2010) focus on the market valuation and frequency
of nonrecurring items that are classified as transitory on a firm's income statement. They
find that, on average, infrequently reported special items have generally low value
relevance in the market because they are viewed as transitory gains and losses. Special
items become an issue, however, when special items that are transitory in theory are in
fact recurring. Cready et al. (2010) state two particular reasons as to why nonrecurring
specialty items may occur frequently and become less transitory in firms: (1) the operating
environment of the firm may impact its decision to classify expenses as transitory (2)
management is misclassifying the expenses depending on their threshold of materiality as
stated by their aggressive or conservative reporting methods. It can be assumed that there
are industries where multiple nonrecurring expenses may be the norm. To test for the
operating environment of a firm and its correlation with reoccurring special expense items,
their research design includes a multitude of control variables to test for strong
relationships between certain firm classifications and an increase or decrease in the
-9 -

number of special items, thus increasing the robustness of the research design. Secondly,
by narrowing the focus of the investigation to reoccurring expenses to "restructuring,"
which are highly discretionary in nature, the effect of management manipulation of
earnings can be more easily evaluated.
In order to determine if multiple occurrences of special items are more or less relevant
than single occurrences, the study by Black et al. (2000) investigates both trends of
reporting and determines that multiple occurrences of nonrecurring items and single
reported charges are valuable to investors. However, single occurrence special items are
both relevant and positively correlated to market value. Multiple occurrences, however,
are also shown to be value relevant, but indicative of poor firm performance and financial
instability, thus indicating the negative market value of multiple occurrences of special
items.
Black et al.' s (2010) findings are consistent with those of Elliott and Hanna (1996),
indicating that multiple prior special items have a negative effect on the earnings response
coefficient of earnings.

The former research, however, argues that if multiple past

occurrences are the trend for a certain company then their most recent special item, either
negative or positive, will have a negative impact on the firm's current stock return due to
the market discounting the discretionary write-offs.
Francis et al. (1996) explore the causes and effects of special items, specifically those
charges involving the impairment of assets. Their research investigates two main points:
what factors indicate a firm' s decision to report special items and how the market reacts to
the announcement of a write-off. Their research was conducted before the implementation
of SFAS No. 121, which specified guidelines for reporting special items, and therefore
their research focuses on mainly discretionary special items. Without valid regulation on
reporting nonrecurring gains and losses, the concept of management incentives to declare
write-offs is investigated as a cause of reporting special items.
The research by Francis et al. (1996) is unique in that they separate special items into
different categories based on classification to test for different investor reactions. They
found that inventory charges, which are generally mandatory, are viewed as a negative
signal of future firm performance whereas goodwill impairment and restructuring charges
have positive market reaction because they are thought to indicate an increase in future
- 10 -

economic performance. Additionally, Francis et al. (1996) conclude that the magnitude of
the write-off increases along with historical industry trends, firm size, and a recent change
in management. Additionally, poor past market performance was identified as another
variable that increases the size of special items.
One way my research differs from Francis et al. (1996) is that I investigate the market
reaction of nonrecurring special items separated into positive gains and negative losses
and investigate their difference in market valuation. In comparison, Francis et al. (1996)
investigates only negative special items - assets write-downs in particular - and ignores
the nonrecurring gains.
2.2 Literature Review-Accounting Conservatism

Accounting conservatism has been the subject of intensive research in the last twenty
years. The classic definition of accounting conservatism is: "anticipate no profits but
anticipate all losses" (Bliss, 1924). Basu (1997) interprets conservatism as accountants'
tendency to require higher degrees of verification for the recognition of gains than losses
in accounting. Basu observes that because the verification standards are higher for good
news than bad news, bad news is more timely reflected in earnings than good news. In
addition, Basu (1997) reports that negative earnings are less persistent than positive
earnmgs.
Using the asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure of conservatism, also known as
the Basu (1997) measure, Basu (1997) shows that over the last fifty years the level of
accounting conservatism has increased. Basu (1997) argues that one reason behind this
trend is the increase in corporate and auditor legal liability and litigation risk in the last
few decades.
The four theoretical explanations for accounting conservatism summarized by Watts
(2003a) are as follows: (1) contracting explanation, (2) litigation risk explanation (3) tax
incentive explanation, and (4) political cost explanation. One of the oldest justifications
for accounting conservatism is contracting theory including both debt contract dividend
constraint and compensation agreements between parties. It is argued that conservatism
can decrease the agency costs in both debt and managerial contracts, which arises from the
fact that the inside contractor has more information than the outside contractor, which
- 11 -

induces deadweight agency costs. Firms can also employ accounting conservatism to
achieve tax benefits.

Taxes are deferred for a period by accelerating expenses and

deferring current and future gains. By decreasing the current year tax expense, firms can
increase their firm value (Watts, 2003a). Finally, standard setters have an incentive to
allow accounting conservatism in financial reporting despite the fact the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has supported standards that favor "unbiased"
reporting of gains and losses which conflict with the conservatism principle (Watts,
2003a). Criticism, plus the higher political costs associated with banning conservatism, is
why standard-setting bodies should support accounting conservatism; although this rarely
is the case. In short, Watts (2003a) concludes that accounting conservatism is essential to
financial reporting and standard setters in that it attempts to limit overcompensation of
management and increase the verifiability of earnings.
In the conservatism literature, numerous methods for measunng accounting
conservatism have been developed. A research paper by Wang et al. (2009) investigates
five of the most commonly used and most effective ways of measuring accounting
conservatism: (1) Basu' s (1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure, (2) Ball and
Shivakumar's (2005) asymmetrical-cash-flow-to-accruals measure, (3) the commonly
accepted market-to-book or the book-to-market ratio as investigated by Beaver and Ryan
(2000), (4) Penman and Zhang' s (2002) hidden reserves measures, and (5) Givoly and
Hayn' s (2000) negative-accruals measure. In addition, there are also the asymmetric
persistence of gains and losses measures used by Basu (1997) and the new firm-specific
measure of conservatism developed by Khan and Watts (2009) titled C-Score which is a
firm-specific deviation from the classic Basu (1997) model of asymmetric timeliness of
earnings measure.
The research by Penman and Zhang (2002) investigates the market' reaction to
conservatism accounting. Using their well known hidden reserves measures of accounting
conservatism, they find that investors systematically under-react to the earnings of a
highly conservative form, apparently ignoring the fact the earnings under a high degree of
conservatism will likely increase in the future due to the reversal of hidden reserves. This
research is a challenge to the efficient market hypothesis because it assumes that the
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investors are not able to see through the distorting effect of accounting conservatism on
the time-series property of earnings.
While the areas of the value relevance of special items and accounting conservatism
have been heavily researched individually, there has been little research that explains the
relationship between those two strands of research. One currently published paper that
does address the connection between conservatism and value relevance in general is that
by Balachandran and Mohanram (2011). However, this research is not specifically on
special items. A study which tangentially discusses the implication of accounting
conservatism for special items, in the context of connecting special items, goodwill, and
CEO compensations, was Saito (2011).

While not being the main focus of the Saito

(2011) paper, the author does however mention that nonrecurring items are more timely
representations of bad news than good news, as consistent with Basu (1997) and Watts
(2003b), among others. However, different from our research, Saito's measure of
accounting conservatism is of the unconditional type as proposed by Beaver and Ryan
(2000). She does not apply any measures of conditional conservatism as I do in this paper
(i.e. the Khan and Watts C-Score).

3. Hypotheses development and empirical design

Prior research in accounting conservatism has shown that conservatism is characterized by
the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. In particular, earnings under conservatism involve
a more timely reflection of bad news than good news, as shown in the following graph.
Therefore, when an accounting gain is observed in earnings, the economic news that
generated such a gain has already happened prior to the reporting of earnings.
Conversely, when an accounting loss is reported, the economic news that generated the
loss is more likely to occur in roughly the same period in which the earnings are reported,
or shortly before that.
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Figure 1 : Asymmetric timeliness of earnings under conservatism
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For example, a piece of land gains market value in the first two years due to external
market conditions. However according to US GAAP, the value of land is always carried as
historical cost throughout the first two years, as revaluations is prohibited. 2 When the land
is sold at the beginning of the third year at a price higher than the historical cost, a realized
accounting gain is recognized in earnings, which is a positive special item. Because the
stock price has already increased in response to the land price appreciation in the first two
years, the stock price would not change much at the sales, which means that the stock
price reaction to the sale of land at the beginning of the third year is zero. In other words,
the earnings response coefficient for the positive special item reported in year three should
be zero or very close to zero.
Conversely, if the firm's land value decreased in the first two years, accounting
standards will force an impairment charge in those two years, and nothing at the third year
- the year of the sale. Hence, the impairment charges, which are negative special items,
will coincide in timing with the decreases of stock prices in the first two years. Thus, there
would be a positive correlation between stock returns and the negative special items in the
2 For IFRS, the rule allows the firm to revalue its Property, Plan and Equipment, but the gain should be
reported in the statement of comprehensive income rather than in the income statement. So sti II, one cannot
report the gain in the first two years in earnings.
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first two years. Therefore, the earnings response coefficient for these negative special
items is likely positive and large in magnitude. By comparing the zero (or near zero)
earnings response coefficient of positive special items with the large and positive earnings
response coefficient of negative special items, it is clear that there is an asymmetry
between the market valuation (as measured by ERC) of positive and negative special items
due to accounting conservatism.
Another common type of negative special item is restructuring charges. Generally
speaking, firms have the tendency to recognize restructuring charges sooner than later, to
the extent that accounting standard setters have to lay down strict rules regarding
restructuring charges in order to prevent "big bath" accounting. This, however, does show
that negative restructuring charges are generally speaking quite timely, and therefore
contain more information content than positive special items.

Therefore, I predict that the following phenomena would happen:

1) Positive special items will have a much delayed recognition in earnings than negative
special items, and therefore when a positive special item is reported in earnings the
economic news associated with it would had already been incorporated in stock prices
in prior periods. In contrast, negative special items are more timely recognitions of
current economic news, which will be incorporated into the current period's stock
pnces.

2) The longer the period between the original economic event and the subsequent earnings
release, the less information content is the earnings release, because the longer time
period would enable the investors to gain more information about the nature and
quantity of the economic event through other non-earnings means. For example,
investors would learn more about the event through management's public disclosures,
product information, marketing information, competitors, insider leaks, and financial
analysts. As a result, the information in the subsequent earnings release pertaining to
that economic event would be substantially preempted by those other information
sources. Since good economic news results in more delayed earnings recognition
- 15 -

compared to bad economic news, it is likely that the information about the good news
would be substantially conveyed to the market before the earnings release, leading to
low incremental information content of the gain. Conversely, the accounting loss would
contain more incremental information content than the gain since it is close to the
original event time-wise.

Because of the above two phenomena, I expect negative special items to have more
market valuation impact than positive special items, which leads to my first set of
hypotheses:

Hla: The earnings response coefficient (ERC) for negative special items is
significantly positive.
Hlb: The earnings response coefficient (ERC) for positive special items is not
significantly different than zero.

Because the gains are recognized later in earnings than are compounded into stock prices,
the value relevance of such gains is significantly smaller, even negative, to investors
because they already are aware of the special item gain and discounted the firm value as
such in previous quarters.
Figure 2: Market valuation of special items subject to conservatism
Abnormal Return

Posit veSI

Normal reporting

-·

'
'
,
,
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'

Nega iveSI

"
More conservative reporting
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More conservative reporting

Additionally, as firm reports more conservatively, the value relevance of negative
special items increases making the slope of the "more conservative reporting line" more
steep (increasing) than the "normal reporting" line.
Furthermore, the asymmetric timeliness of earnings is more profound if the degree
of accounting conservatism is higher in a firm. The next question would be in which
direction the asymmetry is traveling in response to an increase in accounting
conservatism.

It is my opinion that the value relevance of negative special items will

increase (and become positive) as conservatism levels rises, because the earlier
recognition of gains implies negative economic events(i.e. bad news) will almost
instantaneously impact on both stock prices and earnings. Conversely, when conservatism
increases, gains are further delayed, the stock returns would not respond much to the
earnings, as it contains very little new information, which causes the ERC for gains to
decrease to an insignificant level. This finding is consistent with previous special item
value relevance papers that exclude positive special items due to a lack of explanatory
power (Black et al., 1999; Cready et al., 201 O; Elliott and Hanna, 1996; Francis et al.,
1996) Hence, I have the following hypothesis:

H2a: The earnings response coefficient (ERC) for negative special items is
increasing in the degree of accounting conservatism.

Naturally, I will investigate how conservatism influences the differential ERC between
positive and negative special items, which leads to the final hypothesis as below:

H2b: The asymmetry between the earnings response coefficient (ERC) for
negative and positive special items is increasing in the degree of
accounting conservatism.

- 17 -

4. Data

The sample used a combination of Compustat and CRSP quarterly data over the nine
years period between 2000 and 2009. The selection of raw sample was determined by
excluding ADR firms and firms in the financial sector. To decrease survivorship bias, both
inactive and current active firms are included in the raw sample. Following the common
practice, the raw sample data was then trimmed according to the top and bottom 1% of
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), special items divided by book value of equity
(SI1), earnings (X), abnormal return (ABRET), size, leverage (LEV), and market-to-book
ratio (MTB). Furthermore, in order to concentrate on positive and negative special items,
we delete those firm-year observations whose value of special item is zero.
SUE is calculated as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items in the
present quarter t less special items and the lagged earnings of t-4 less special items divided
by the quarterly book value of equity for t-4. Size is defined as the natural log of the
market value of equity. Leverage is calculated as the total of short-term (Compustat item
#34) and long-term debt (Compustat item #9) scaled by the market value of equity. The
size and leverage equations used were defined in the research paper by Khan and Watts
(2009). Earnings (X) are calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat
item #18) in the current quarter divided by the market value of equity (Compustat item
MKVL T) of four quarters prior (t-4).
Abnormal returns are calculated using the definition by Cready et al. (2010) which
states that ABRET is equal to quarterly market-adjusted stock return for a firm
accumulated over the period from one trading day after the previous quarter's (t-1)
earnings release date through the earnings release date of the current quarter (t).
variable abnormal return is not immediately collectable from a database.

The

Instead, I

collected the earnings release dates from Compustat which vary between firms, and even
within in each firm between quarters. Then I used the CRSP database to collect daily firm
return indexes from 1998-2008, and used CUSIP numbers from Compustat and CRSP to
run a program to match the firm date to its respective daily return with a MySQL database.
Furthermore, I also collected the market daily return indexes for 1998-2008 and merged
the respective date for each earnings release date to the main dataset. Once I collected the
firm specific return and associated market return, I calculated the abnormal return by
- 18 -

taking the difference between firm index returns and market index returns over each
earnings announcement window for each firm-quarter.
After the above trimming procedure and deleting observations with missing values in
any of the variables, the final sample is consisted of 32, 160 firm-quarters ranging from
years 2000 to 2009. The descriptive statistics for this dataset are displayed in Table 1. The
mean (median) of special item scaled by the beginning quarter equity for the sample is 0.019 (-0.004), indicating that most special items are negative, which is consistent with the
findings in the prior literature (Elliot and Hanna 1996, Francis et al. 1996). The mean
(median) values for SUE, ABRET, and C_SCORE are 0.005 (0.004), 0.006 (-0.005), and
0.000 (0.001), respectively. Note that C_SCORE is the firm-specific measure of
accounting conservatism used developed by Khan and Watts (2009). This measure is
discussed in the following section.
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix used for this quarterly sample of data. The
top right corner of the matrix is the Pearson correlations while the lower left hand corner
is the Spearman rank correlations. The Pearson (Spearman) correlations for special items
and C-Score are -0.049 (-0.072) indicating that as the level of conservatism increases, its
correlation with special items decreases. Abnormal returns and C-Score have a positive
Pearson (Spearman) correlation of 0.017 (-0.075) indicating that increasing conservatism
levels results in larger abnormal returns.

The relationship between special items and

abnormal returns has the indication of a positive relationship due to a positive correlation
coefficient of 0.062 (0.063).

5. Empirical Tests and Results
5.1 C-Score measure of accounting conservatism

I will test my hypotheses using a firm-year-specific measure of accounting
conservatism called C-Score (Khan and Watts, 2009). It is imperative that the measure of
accounting conservatism is firm-year-specific in this study. This criterion eliminates the
use of the popular Basu (1997) measure as it is not firm-specific. The Penman and
Zhang' s hidden-reserves measure of accounting conservatism, although being firm
specific, is not used in this study because it has a higher data requirement than other
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measures. 3 In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the functionality and calculation of
the C-Score measures in detail.
The measure of conservatism adopted in this paper is the C-Score measure developed
by Khan and Watts (2009).

The C-Score measure is an extension of the asymmetric

timeliness concept by Basu (1997) which is applied in a firm-year-specific context.
Unlike the original Basu model, C-Score uses three instrumental variables - firm size,
MTB ratio, and leverage levels - which have been empirically proven to vary with
conservatism levels, to allow for Basu-type measure of conservatism on a firm-year level
(Khan and Watts, 2009). Broadly speaking, C-score is a measure of "conditional"
conservatism because it incorporates the idea of asymmetric timeliness of earnings.
The variables selected to be used in the C-Score calculation were deliberately chosen
due to the fact that they incorporate the four main factors that cause changes in
conservatism as defined by Watts (2003a): contracting, litigation, taxation, and regulation.
The variables of MTB, size, and leverage are all affected by the firm's investment
opportunity set thus using them in the equation for C-Score should ideally capture
fluctuations in conservatism levels (Khan and Watts, 2009). Following Khan and Watts
(2009), to calculate C-Score, the following cross-sectional regression is run each year over
the ten years from 1999 to 2009:

Xi

=

/30

+

/31Di

+

Ri(µ0

+

+

Di Ri0-o

+

(o0SIZEi

µ1SIZEi

+

.A1SIZEi

+

+

µ2MTBi

+

o1MTBi

+

.A2MTBi

+

o2LEVi

µ3LEVi)

+

.A3LEVi)

+

o3DiSIZEi

+

o4DiMTBi

+

o5DiLEVi)
(1)

Where
X

:

D

:

R

:

SIZE

:

yearly earnings
dummy variable defined as I if R<O and 0 ifR>O
yearly firm returns
size of the firm calculated by the natural log of the market value of equity

3 The Penman and Zhang (2002) measure of conservatism requires available data on R&D expenses and
advertising expenses, which are mostly missing from the Compustat database. If we adopt this measure, we
would have to sacrifice too much data.
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MTB

:

LEV

:

the market-to-book ratio
firm leverage calculated by the sum of long-term and short-term debt scaled

by the market value of equity

The results of the regression (1) are summarized in Table 3. The coefficients are the
mean coefficients from the regressions for the years from 1999 to 2009. Following the
Fama-MacBeth procedure, the t-statistic is calculated as each mean coefficients divided by
its respective standard deviations. These coefficients are then used to calculate CS for
each firm over the time horizon by the following equation:

The results of the CS calculation can be found in Table 3 and the descriptive statistics
table in the appendix. Once calculated, the values were added to the dataset in order to
later be used in the ERC regression models as an independent variable.
5.2 Test of Hypothesis 1

In order to test the

Hl,

which predicts that the ERC for negative special items is

greater than that of positive special items, we conduct the following control variable
regression.

(2)

where
:

A BRET

the abnormal return is the quarterly market-adjusted stock return per firm
collected over the period of one day after the earnings announcement date

for the prior quarter (t-1) through the earnings announcement date for the
current quarter.
:

SUE
Sii

:

the standardized unexpected earnings
the special items reported in each quarter divided by beginning book value of
equity
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The above regression model is adapted from Elliott and Hanna (1996) and Cready et
al. (2010), which test how well abnormal stock returns are explained by the standard SUE
variable, as well as equity-scaled special items (SI I). Elliott and Hanna (1996) argue that
the ERC on special items (SI 1) is smaller than that on normal earnings, which is proxied
for by SUE, because special items are less persistent than normal earnings. Regression (2)
allows two separate ERCs for positive and negative special items by separating the dataset
into negative and positive special items and running the regression separately for each
subset. The difference between negative and positive special items' ERC is captured by
the coefficient 82• Hypothesis la implies that 82 should be significantly greater than zero
for negative special items and hypothesis I b states that 82 is not significantly different
from zero for positive special items.
The actual result of estimating regression (2) with the sample data is reported in Table
4. The ERC Ct-statistic) for negative special items 82 is 0.103 (4.567) and significant at
I% level. As predicted, the ERC for positive special items ( 82) is 0.066 (0. 779) and not
statistically significant. These results are highly consistent with Hypotheses I a and I b.
5.3 Test of Hypothesis 2

To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b which argue that the ERC of positive and negative
special items and the difference between them are changing as the degree of accounting
conservatism increases, Regression model (3) is estimated separately for positive and
negative special items, as follows:

where
A BRET

: the abnormal return is the quarterly market-adjusted stock return per
firm collected over the period of one day after the earnings
announcement date for the prior quarter (t-1) through the earnings
announcement date for the current quarter.

SUE

:

the standardized unexpected earnings
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Sii

: the special items reported in each quarter divided by beginning book
value of equity

C SCORE

: the C-score conservatism measure for each firm

According to Hypotheses 2a and 2b, I predict the following:
First, for negative special items, (34, which is the interaction effect between negative
special items and C-Score on abnormal returns, will be positive and significant. This
positive (34 indicates that as the degree of conservatism (i.e. C-score) increases, the
earnings response coefficient (ERC) of negative special items also increases.
Second, for positive special items, {34, which is the interaction effect between positive
special items and C-Score on abnormal returns, will be negative, but not significantly
different from zero. The two values of {34, for negative and positive special items
respectively, are significantly different from each other. Thus, the /34 for negative special
items minus the /34 for positive special items would be significantly positive. In other
words, when the degree of conservatism increases the asymmetry between the ERCs for
negative and positive special items gets bigger.
The empirical results of estimation Regression (3) can be found in Table 5. Consistent
with Hypothesis 2a, I found that the earnings response coefficient is significantly
increasing for negative special items as the degree of conservatism increases (/34 = 20.992,
t-stat = 3.095). By comparison, the interaction effect between positive special items and
C-Score (the proxy for conservatism) for abnormal return is negative (/34

=

-25.640, t

stat= -1.066), although not significantly, which indicates that the earnings response
coefficient on positive special items is only weakly decreasing with the degree of
accounting conservatism.
It is observable that the value of the coefficient (34 is relatively large. This is due to the
fact that the C-Score values are quite small for the majority of firms. In this case, perhaps
the t-statistic is a better indicator for the strength of the effects of C-Score on the earnings
response coefficient of special items. Lastly, it can be easily determined that the difference
between these two coefficients is 20.992 - (-25.640)

=

46.632, which is also statistically

significant at the 5% according to a pooled-sample t statistic.
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In summary of Section 5, my empirical results are consistent with the theoretical
hypotheses using C-Score as a measure of accounting conservatism. The empirical
evidence show that as the level of conservatism increases, the earnings response
coefficient for positive special is not significantly different from zero, or irrelevant,
indicating that for a very conservative firm, the gains reported as special items do not
provide much value relevant information to the stock market. Conversely, the opposite is
found for negative special items. Because accounting losses reported as negative special
items, such as impairment charges and restructuring charges, are more timely reported,
they tend to contain more value relevant information to investors. In addition, because of
the short interval between the underlying economic event and the reporting of negative
special items, stock returns and the earnings are more likely to be in the same period,
which further increases the earnings response coefficient of negative special items.

6. An Alternative Explanation

While the result of regression (3) is consistent with Hypothesis 2, which is based on
the rationale that accounting conservatism leads to a lower information content in positive
special items than in negative special items, the empirical result is also consistent with an
alternative explanation: the ERC for negative special items may be greater than the ERC
for positive special items because negative special items may be more persistent than
positive ones. Although this alternative explanation is just as justified by the results of
regression (2), it however cannot easily explain the empirical findings of regression (3)
which gives evidence of the strong relationship between accounting conservatism and the
market valuation of special items.
I would like to point out that the alternative explanation that the asymmetry between
the ERC of positive and negative special items is due to the different levels of earnings
persistence is inconsistent with my regressions (3a,b) These two regressions clearly show
.

a strong link between ERC and the degree of conservatism, but do not address the
relationship between ERC and earnings persistence. In fact, according the Basu (1997)
paper, the more conservative a firm is, the less persistent its accounting losses are relative
to gains. This would mean that the negative special items would have lower earnings
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response coefficient than would positive special items. This is clearly refuted by the
empirical evidence presented in this paper.
The persistence and frequency of reporting special items is beyond the scope of this
paper.

However, it does leave room for additional research in the future on the

asymmetric value relevance of accounting conservatism and persistence levels in regards
to special item market valuation.

I propose additional research on the topic of value

relevance, using ERC tests, between frequency and persistence of special items and
abnormal returns. Furthermore, I plan to test how this explanatory variable compares to
this research on accounting conservatism as an explanation and run empirical tests to
determine the difference between the two and determine which occurrence has the greater
affect and thus more value to investors.

7. Conclusions and limitations

This paper offers theoretical and empirical evidence that the asymmetrical valuation of
negative and positive special items can be, at least partially, explained by accounting
conservatism.

In particular, I examine how earning response coefficients (ERC) of both

positive and negative special items respond to different levels of accounting conservatism.
Consistent with my hypotheses, empirical tests illustrate that as levels of accounting
conservatism increase, negative special items' ERC increases while positive special items'
ERC decreases to a point of insignificance to investors.

Therefore, it is likely that

investors are valuing nonrecurring losses more highly than nonrecurring gains because
accounting conservatism makes nonrecurring losses more timely, and thus more useful to
investors, than nonrecurring gains. Thus, I conclude that conservatism is likely an
important factor that influences the market valuation of special items.
This paper fills in the gap in the literature by linking the valuation of special items and
conservatism. Most prior research on special items research typically discard positive
special items from their samples, acknowledging a lack of value relevance for positive
special items and disregards them all together from their empirical studies; this research,
however, contributes to the literature by analyzing as to why a discrepancy in valuation
coefficients exists between nonrecurring gains and losses. By doing so, this research
- 25 -

explicitly links value relevance research and accounting conservatism research, which not
only has significant explanatory power for the valuation coefficient of special items but
also has implications for other types of accounting earnings. The latter topic can be
addressed in future research.
This paper has the following limitations: First, our research utilizes only one, albeit a
strongly supported, measure for accounting conservatism - the Khan and Watts (2009) C
Score - which may not be the proxy that all researchers would agree to use to measure
conservatism. The topic of measuring accounting conservatism has been the subject of
intense debate recently and no conclusion as to the best measure of conservatism has yet
been reached. Second, this paper does not address the issue of how the frequency of
special items impacts on their value relevance. Incorporating the frequency issue into our
paper would significantly raise the complexity and scope of the present paper, which is
best left to future research. Third, by focusing on special items alone, this paper does not
address how the value relevance of other types of earnings would interact with accounting
conservatism. Doing that would take us much further outside the scope of the present
study. But this is nevertheless a useful research topic to study in the future.
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Appendix

Table 1: D escriptive Statistics
Mean
NI
A B R ET
Sil
SALES

19 .406

Std. Dev

Ql

2 . 084

1 5 1 . 689

-3.065

1 9 . 646

Media n

Q3

0. 006

-0. 005

0 . 204

-0. 1 1 5

0 . 108

-0.019

- 0 . 004

0.056

-0.018

0 .000

609. 370

1 3 1 . 650

1594.621

3 0 . 9 80

480 . 2 50

TL

1703 . 000

281 .400

4449 . 7 5 5

4 8 . 6 50

1 188.000

TA

2 7 3 2 . 000

610. 700

6382.411

1 5 3 . 000

2 2 10 . 000

MV

3 2 24. 860

86 2 . 7 3 2

6 3 5 2 . 394

242.541

2 8 6 2 . 574

ROE

-4.907

5 . 538

235.091

-8.481

1 3 . 852

ROI

-6.417

3 . 3 57

64.430

- 5 . 6 34

8.801

1 0 2 8 . 6 60

28 5 . 160

2243.954

8 2 . 5 10

9 1 1 . 850

EQU ITY
EAR N I NG S

19.371

2 . 1 54

1 2 2 .076

-2.818

19.255

SUE

0 . 005

0 . 004

0.090

-0.015

0.022

MTB

4.297

1 .976

134.495

1 . 240

3.261

PRICE
SI
C_SCO R E

2 4 . 3 00

1 4 . 500

5 0 3 . 3 34

6.381

26.920

-11.118

- 1 .000

79.266

-5.758

-0.010

0 . 000

0.001

0 . 003

-0.001

0.002

Th is tab le shows the descriptive statistics for a total of 32, 1 60 firm-years ranging from 2000 to 2009. The
mean, median, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), first (Q I ) and third (Q3) quartiles are reported . N I is annual
net income. A B R ET is the quarterly-adjusted stock return accumulated from one trad ing day after the
earnings announcement date for the prior quarter (t- 1 ) through the earn ings announcement date for the
current quarter (t). SI is special items as defined by Compustat. SI I is special items scaled by the book
value of equity. Sales are the quarterly sales for the firms. TL is total liabilities or debt. TA is total assets.
MY is market value of equity. ROE is return on equity. ROI is return on investment. Equity is the average
of book value of firm equity. Earnings are income before extraordinary items (Compustat data item #8).
Price is the closing stock price on the last day of the quarter averaged for total of exam ined firms from 20002009 . S U E is defined as the difference between earnings in quarter t less special items and earnings in
quarter t-4 less special items scaled by the quarterly book value of equity i n quarter t-4. MTB is m arket-to
book ratio. C-Score is a firm-specific conservatism measure as created by Khan and Watts (2009).
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix

NI
NI

A BRET
0.055

EQU ITY

EARN

SUE

MTB

PRICE

cs

0. 129

0.519

0.957

0.120

0.002

0 . 147

-0.161

0.029

0.055

0.024

0.055

0.075

-0.004

0.050

0.017

0.060

0 . 046

0.228

0. 064

0 . 2 04

-0.014

-0.078

0.061

-0.049

0.735

0.636

0.029

0.095

0 . 674

0.461

0 . 002

-0.005

0 . 148

-0.282

0.977

0 . 7 10

0.030

0.079

0 . 8 14

0.449

0.006

-0.004

0 . 1 34

-0. 3 6 2

0.786

0.030

0 . 090

0.920

0.498

0. 007

-0.007

0 . 149

-0.368

0 . 044

0 . 144

0.828

0.623

0.033

0 . 003

0.215

-0. 340

0.101

0.026

0 . 040

-0.008

-0.031

0.027

-0.030

0.099

0.133

0. 042

-0. 030

0.126

-0. 1 5 0

0.525

0 . 009

-0.012

0 . 1 57

-0.332

0 . 1 26

0 . 002

0.151

-0 . 1 67

0 . 040

0.022

0.011

0.003

-0. 004

SI

SALE

TL

TA

MV

ROE

ROI

0.196

0.451

0.452

0.498

0.613

0.039

0.062

0.012

0.019

0.022

0.058

0.041

0.032

0 . 045

0 . 7 19

A BRET

0. 139

SI

0.339

0.063

SALES

0 . 585

0.078

0.076

TL

0.513

0.075

0 . 0 60

0.921

TA

0.552

0.080

0.096

0.930

0.972

MV

0.625

0 . 1 19

0.123

0. 844

0.852

0 . 9 14

ROE

0.692

0.121

0 . 2 29

0.481

0.401

0.423

0.513

ROI

0.673

0. 1 1 5

0.245

0.444

0 . 3 28

0.373

0.492

0 . 9 50

EQU ITY

0.570

0.083

0. 147

0.879

0.871

0.954

0 . 9 20

0.422

0.408

EARN

0.970

0 . 141

0 . 345

0. 594

0.519

0.557

0.629

0.706

0.686

0.573

SUE

0.251

0.141

-0.053

0.071

0.052

0 . 046

0. 101

0 . 188

0.175

0.037

0 . 2 59

MTB

0.282

0 . 1 27

0 . 0 17

0.082

0 . 105

0 . 084

0.366

0 . 3 64

0. 344

0.025

0.281

0 . 040

PRICE

0.592

0 . 1 50

0 . 148

0.653

0.627

0 . 6 64

0.755

0 . 600

0.591

0.670

0.597

-0.606

0.377

C_SCORE

-0.468

-0.075

-0.072

-0.695

-0.720

-0.750

-0.781

-0.416

-0.393

-0. 7 2 3

-0.477

-0.071

-0.297

-0.133
-0 . 606

The tab le shows the means of cross-sectional correlations for 32, 1 60 firm-years from 2000-2009. The upper right triangle of the matrix is the Pearson
correlations. The bottom left triangle is the Spearman correlations. NI is annual net income. ABRET is the quarterly-adjusted stock return accumulated from
one trading day after the earnings announcement date for the prior quarter (t- 1 ) through the earnings announcement date for the current quarter (t). SI is special
items as defined by Compustat scaled by the book value of equity. Sales are the quarterly sales for the firms. TL is total liab i l ities or debt. TA is total assets.
MV is market value of equity. ROE is return on equity. ROI is return on investment. Equity is the average of book value of firm equity at quarter-end. Price is
the closing stock price on the last day of the quarter averaged for total of examined firms from 2000-2009 . S U E is defined as the difference between earnings in
quarter t less special items and earnings in quarter t-4 less special items scaled by the quarterly book value of equity in quarter t-4. MTB is market-to-book ratio.
C-Score is a firm-specific conservatism measure as created by Khan and Watts (2009).

Table 3: C score regression using Fama-MacBath procedure

Xi = {30

+

+

Ri(µ0 + µ15/ZEi + µ2MTBi + µ3LEVi)
Di Ri(}i.. 0 + }.15/ZEi + A2MTBi + }. 3LE VJ
+ (805/ZEi + o1MTBi + o2LEVi + o3DiSIZEi
+ Ei

{J1Di

+

l n d e p . Variable

o4DiMTBi

+

o5DiLEVi)

Coefficient

t-stat

I ntercept

-0. 2 1 3 7

-1.7779

D

-0.0263

-0. 2480

-0.0029

-1. 5678

R ET U R N
R E T x S IZE

Pred. sign

+

+
+

0 . 0004

1 . 3 24 5

RET x MTB

0 . 0000

0.4 284

RET x LEV

0 . 0001

0.0965

0 . 00 6 2

2 . 5487

-0.0009

-1.9761

D x RET U R N
D x R E T x SIZE
D x RET x MTB
D x RET x LEV

+
+
+

0 . 0000

-0.4026

0 . 0000

- 0 . 0 100

SIZE

0.0377

2.1522

MTB

-0.0009

- 0 . 2 245

LEV

-0.0678

-0.9259

D x S IZE

0.0026

0 . 1 694

D x MTB

0.0013

0 . 3382

D x LEV

0.0113

0.1862

This table shows t h e mean coefficients from annual regressions of earnings on t h e variables listed above from
1 999-2009 which includes 5 1 ,300 fi rm years. D is a control variable which is equal to I if R ETURN is
negative and 0 if R E T U RN is positive. SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity. MTB is market
to-book ratio. L E V is leverage which is calculated by the sum of long-term and short-term debt scaled by
market value of equity. These variables were originally used in the paper by Khan and Watts (2009).

Table 4: Regressing abnormal returns on SUE and SI

ABRETit
l n d e p . Variable

Pred . Sign

=

(}0

+ f}

1SUEit

+

fJ2S/1it

Coeff.

+

t-stat.

cit
Sign if.

Positive Special Items {Sl>O)
Intercept
SUE
Sil

+
+/-

0.018

6 . 660

***

0.127

4.811

***

0.066

0.779

Negative Special Items {Sl<O)
I ntercept
SUE
Sil

+
+/-

**

0 . 004

2 . 657

0 . 2 06

14. 3 3 2

***

4 . 567

***

0. 103

This table shows the regression coefficients, basic t-statistics, and the s ignificance levels for hypothesis 1 . The
data used is from the Compustat database and covers 32, 1 60 firm years ranging from 2000-2009. ABR ET is
the quarterly-adjusted stock return accumulated from one trading day after the earnings announcement date for
the prior quarter (t- 1 ) through the earnings announcement date for the current quarter (t). S I 1 is defined as
special items scaled by the book value of equity in the same quarter. S U E is defined as the d i fference between
earnings in quarter t less special items and earnings in quarter t-4 less special items scaled by the quarterly
book value of equity in quarter t-4. D is a control variable that stipulates that if S I<O, it w i l l equal I otherwise
the value is equal to 0. The sign ificance code for this table is as fo l lows: ' * * * ' for 0 .0 1 , ' * * ' for 0.05, and ' * '
0. 1 0.
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Table 5: Regressing abnormal returns on SUE and C-score

ABRETit

=

l n d e p . Variable

{30

+

{31SUEit

+

Pred . Sign

{32511it

+

{33 C_SCOREit

Coeff.

+

{345/ lit C_SCOREit

t-stat.

+

Eit

Sign if.

Positive Special Items {Sl>O)
Intercept
SUE

+

Sil

+/-

C_SCO R E
S i l : C_SCO R E

0.017

6.222

***

0.126

4.790

***

0 . 080

0. 897

2 . 017

2 . 29 4

- 2 5 . 640

- 1 . 06 6

*

Negative Special Items {Sl<O)
I ntercept
SUE

+

Sil

+/-

C_SCOR E
S i l : C_SC O R E

+

0.003

2 . 20 1

0 . 207

14 . 3 5 4

0.081

3.251

1 .765

-4.022

20.992

3 . 09 5

*
***
**
***
**

This table shows the coefficients from the regression that tests the conservatism m easure of C-Score i n a
valuation equation designed for special items . The test is separated by sign of special item s. The data used is
from the Compustat database and covers 32, 1 60 firm years ranging from 2000-2009. AB RET is the quarterly
adjusted stock return accumulated from one trading day after the earnings announcement date for the prior
quarter (t- 1 ) through the earnings announcement date for the current quarter (t). S 1 1 is defined as special items
scaled by the book value of equity in the same quarter. S U E is defined as the difference between earnings in
quarter (t) less special items and earnings in quarter (t-4) less special item s scaled by the quarterly book value of
equity in quarter (t-4). C-Score is a firm-specific conservative measure designed by Khan and Watts (2009).
The s ignificance code for thi s table is as follows: ' * * * ' for 0.0 1 , ' * * ' for 0.05, and ' * ' 0 . 1 0 .
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